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SAIL WE MUST: WHY ICSID PROCEEDINGS 




[W]e must sail sometimes with the wind and sometimes against it — but 
we must sail, and not drift, not lie at anchor. 
– Oliver Wendell Holmes1 
 
This Article shows that the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes’ (ICSID) current rules for arbitration, which 
automatically suspend the arbitration proceeds, are direct contributors to 
the high costs and long proceedings in ICSID. The Articles also argues that 
failing to eliminate the automatic suspension of proceedings is simply 
putting off a change that will inevitably need to be made. Following 
complaints that investment arbitrations were too costly and too lengthy, 
ICSID finally began addressing the issue of arbitrator disqualifications by 
initiating a round of amendments in October 2016. ICSID has proposed two 
different remedies to this problem, which could replace the original rule: the 
first proposal would provide a much-needed increase in ICSID’s efficiency, 
but the second proposal is little more than an entrenchment of the status quo. 
ICSID should adopt a slightly modified version of the first proposal to 
continue the proceedings in the face of arbitrator challenges. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Though the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), which has administered the majority of all international investment 
cases and has styled itself as the “the world’s leading institution devoted to 
international investment dispute settlement,”2 has amended its Convention 
Arbitration Rules four times, its rules on arbitrator disqualifications have 
merely drifted, batted about by various cross winds, until quite recently.3 
Following complaints that investment arbitrations were too costly and too 
lengthy, ICSID finally began addressing the issue of arbitrator 
disqualifications by initiating a round of amendments in October 2016. After 
taking suggestions from Member States and the public on rule-amendment 
topics, the ICSID Secretariat produced an initial working paper (WP # 1) on 
August 2, 2018.4 Following a second round of written comments from 
Member States and the public, consultation meetings with Member States, 
and presentations, ICSID issued an updated working paper (WP # 2) on 
 
 2.  About ICSID, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES [ICSID]: 
WORLD BANK GROUP, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/ default.aspx (last visited May 3, 
2019). 
 3.  ICSID, Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules 154 (ICSID Working Paper # 2, 2019) 
[hereinafter WP # 2]. 
 4.  Id. 
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March 15, 2019.5 ICSID intends for Member States to vote on the 
amendments in October 2019.6 
The most recent round of amendments marks the fifth time ICSID has 
altered its Regulations and Rules in its fifty-year history, the last time being 
in 2006.7 In the thirteen years since the last round of amendments, thirteen 
new Member States have joined the ICSID Convention (“the Convention”), 
while Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela each left the Convention.8 The 
caseload has also increased: fifty-three cases were filed in 2018, more than 
double the number filed in 2006.9 Yet this growth has not come without 
challenges. ICSID Secretary-General Meg Kinnear views the amendments 
not only as part of a periodic reconsideration of the rules, but as a direct 
response to the criticisms that investor-state dispute settlement is not 
sufficiently efficient and cost-effective and that it does not adequately 
respect state sovereignty.10 
In this Article, I will show that the current rules for arbitrator 
disqualifications, which automatically suspend the arbitration proceedings, 
are direct contributors to the high costs and long proceedings in ICSID and 
will argue that failing to eliminate the automatic suspension of proceedings 
is simply putting off a change that will inevitably need to be made. The 
average delay created by an arbitrator challenge is eighty-one days.11 With 
individual cases seeing anywhere from one to nine arbitrator challenges, this 
delay can quickly become unwieldy.12 ICSID has proposed two different 
remedies to this problem that could replace the original rule: the WP # 1 
proposal would provide a much-needed increase in ICSID’s efficiency, but 
the WP # 2 proposal is little more than an entrenchment of the status quo. 
ICSID should adopt the WP # 1 proposal to continue the proceedings in the 
face of arbitrator challenges. 
In Section II, I include the current rule in the Convention, outline 
criticisms of the procedure currently in place, and present ICSID’s proposals 
to update the rules on arbitrator challenges. I also detail four ways in which 
ICSID takes a different approach than the rules of other arbitral systems: the 
rules differ in whether arbitrator challenges are dealt with through an 
 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Alexander G. Leventhal, The 2018 Proposals for Amendments of the ICSID Rules: ICSID 
Enters the Era of Trump, Populism, and State Sovereignty, 22 AM. SOC’Y INT’L LAW INSIGHTS 15 (2018). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics, THE ICSID CASELOAD – STATISTICS, no. 1, 2019, at 
1, 7. 
 10.  Leventhal, supra note 7. 
 11.  See infra Appendix 1. 
 12.  Id. 
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automatic suspension of the proceedings under the rules, when challenges 
may be brought, who considers the challenges, and what standard is applied 
to the challenges. 
Section III includes an assessment of whether arbitrator challenges 
create a problem in the form of increased cost and time by comparing the 
number of successful arbitrator challenges to unsuccessful challenges. 
Though some sources have compiled lists of all arbitrator challenges in 
ICSID cases, these compilations have become outdated.13 The argument in 
this Article adds to the scholarship by laying out the length of the delay each 
of these challenges has caused, a statistic no other article has analyzed. The 
data gathered show the percentage of cases with challenges, the total amount 
of delay through challenges, and the success rate through challenges. 
In Section IV, I apply the data to the problems identified in Section III. 
There I argue that, because only five of the 146 arbitrator challenges that 
have been made public have been upheld, there is a need for change from the 
status quo.14 It also explains that Rule 29 is the appropriate change for four 
reasons: 1) Rule 29 would decrease the overall number of challenges and the 
number of arbitrators that resign after a party files an arbitrator challenge 
against them, 2) Rule 29 would make challenges that are still made less 
disruptive to the arbitral proceedings than under the current rule, 3) WP # 2’s 
term limits do not eliminate the need for Rule 29’s continuation of the 
proceedings, and 4) adopting Rule 29 would not call into question the 
legitimacy of the tribunal’s decisions. I conclude in Section V that WP # 1 
is the right approach for ICSID to take. 
II. ICSID REFORM PROPOSAL 
The original rule for arbitrator disqualification stands in stark contrast 
to the proposed changes in their initial form, though the proposal eventually 
drifted back to the status quo. At present, the original rule provides a 
procedurally murky avenue for parties to delay proceedings: even though the 
actual disqualification process is unclear, it is accompanied by an automatic 
suspension of the arbitration until the conflict is resolved. The first set of 
proposed changes provided both procedural clarity and eliminated automatic 
suspension. These proposals drew the ire of select vocal opponents, who 
lobbied for a more tempered shift away from the status quo. The latest round 
 
 13.  See generally Meg Kinnear & Frauke Nitschke, Disqualification of Arbitrators under the ICSID 
Convention and Rules, in CHALLENGES AND RECUSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2014); see also KAREL DAELE, 
CHALLENGE AND DISQUALIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 455–61 
(2012). 
 14.  See infra Appendix 1. 
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of proposals, while offering some additional procedural clarity, continue 
automatic suspensions, as with the original rule. Each of these steps are 
addressed in turn below. 
A. Original Rule 
Article 57 of the Convention empowers a party to propose the 
disqualification of a member of the arbitral tribunal “on account of any fact 
indicating a manifest lack of qualities required by paragraph (1) of Article 
14.”15 Although it never provides an explanation of these qualities, Article 
14(1) of the Convention requires that arbitrators on ICSID tribunals be 
individuals who possess “high moral character” and “recognized 
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry, or finance” and be 
capable of exercising “independent judgment.”16 Yet these characteristics 
receive no further definition or delineation.17 The Convention outlines no 
other requirements for members of the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators. The three 
main grounds for challenge ICSID has seen in cases with proposals for 
arbitrator disqualifications are nationality, lack of capacity, and lack of 
independence.18 Historically, lack of independence has been the most widely 
used of the three.19 Most disqualification proposals allege partiality of the 
challenged arbitrator based on various factual circumstances, which would 
purportedly affect his or her ability to exercise independent judgment.20 
If a party does decide to pursue disqualification, Article 58 of the 
Convention lays out the relevant procedure.21 Pursuant to this article, a party 
first files a proposal for disqualification with the Secretary-General, then the 
Secretary-General transmits the proposal to the tribunal and the Chairman 
 
 15.  ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, art. 57, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/ 
resources/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf [hereinafter Convention]. 
 16.  Id. art. 14(1). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Meg Kinnear, Challenge of Arbitrators at ICSID—An Overview, 108 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 
412, 414–15 (2014). The disqualification based on nationality is applicable when a sole arbitrator or the 
majority of arbitrators has the same nationality as either of the parties without an agreement by both 
parties. Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 415. 
 21.  The Article reads: 
The decision on any proposal to disqualify a conciliator or arbitrator shall be taken by the other 
members of the Commission or Tribunal as the case may be, provided that where those 
members are equally divided, or in the case of a proposal to disqualify a sole conciliator or 
arbitrator, or a majority of the conciliators or arbitrators, the Chairman shall take that decision. 
If it is decided that the proposal is well-founded the conciliator or arbitrator to whom the 
decision relates shall be replaced in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Chapter III 
or Section 2 of Chapter IV. 
Convention, supra note 15, art. 58. 
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and notifies the other party of the proposal.22 In response, the accused 
arbitrator may submit explanations to the tribunal or Chairman.23 The other 
members of the tribunal make the first effort at deciding on the proposal, but 
the role of decision-maker passes to the Chairman if the remaining tribunal 
members are equally divided.24 If proposals for disqualification are filed 
against a majority of the arbitrators, the ability to decide on the matter passes 
directly to the Chairman.25 
ICSID does not provide a clear timeline outlining when parties to the 
arbitration may file a proposal for an arbitral disqualification. Rule 9 requires 
that proposals for disqualification be brought “promptly,” as measured 
relative to the date on which the filing party becomes aware of the 
circumstances on which the claim is based, and before the proceedings are 
closed.26 While the timeliness of the proposal is determined on a case-by-
case basis, ICSID tribunals have decided that filing a challenge within ten 
days of discovering the underlying facts fulfilled the promptness 
requirement, whereas filing after fifty-three days did not.27 
The Convention is similarly vague when providing for arbitrator 
challenges. The Convention gives no express time constraint to the 
remaining members of the tribunal for deciding arbitrator challenges, 
although it does state that they “shall promptly consider and vote on the 
proposal [for arbitrator disqualification].28 A recommended timeframe of 
thirty days is provided in the case that the proposal is sent to the Chairman, 
but the rule provides only that the Chairman will use his or her “best efforts” 
to make a decision on the proposal. 
Even with the recommended timeframe, Chairman-led determinations 
still predominately fail to adhere to the timeline. Additionally, there are no 
safeguards in place to move proceedings forward when the Chairman does 
 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), rule 9(3) (2006) 
[hereinafter Arbitration Rules]. 
 24.  Convention, supra note 15, at art. 58. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Arbitration Rules, supra note 23, at rule 9(6); see also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Arbitral 
Tribunal, ¶ 23 (Oct. 22, 2007) (“Prof. Christoph Schreuer specifically addresses the question of the 
meaning of ‘promptly’ with respect to challenges to disqualify an arbitrator . . . ‘Promptly means that the 
proposal to disqualify must be made as soon as the party concerned learns of the grounds for a possible 
disqualification.’”). 
 27.  Burlington Res., Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/05, Decision on the 
Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ¶ 73 (Dec. 13, 2013). 
 28.  Arbitration Rules, supra note 23, at rule 9(4). 
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exceed the thirty-day period.29 Of the 110 arbitrator challenges that have 
reached a decision, fifty-seven of them were decided by the Chairman and 
forty-six of them were decided by the remaining co-arbitrators. The identity 
of the decision-maker was not made public in the remaining seven cases. The 
Chairman decided on the proposal within the thirty-day recommendation 
period only seven times, or in twelve percent of proposals that came before 
him or her. The Chairman has made decisions in as few as eleven days, but 
he or she has also needed as long as 231 days to consider a proposal, which 
is almost eight times the recommended timeframe. 
Notably, arbitral proceedings are suspended until either the 
unchallenged arbitrators or the Chairman decide on the proposal for 
disqualification.30 This procedure has the effect of lengthening the 
adjudication process.31 
B. Need for Change 
The aforementioned rules governing disqualification have been 
untouched since 1968, with only minor exceptions, but it appears that many 
Member States are unhappy with the rules as they are.32 After ICSID opened 
the discussion for potential member topics, multiple Member States and 
members of the public mentioned the need to reconsider the rules on the 
disqualification of arbitrators.33 
Specifically, in comments during the proposal process, multiple 
Member States were concerned with parties, and particularly states, 
launching arbitrator challenges as a “strategic tool” to buy additional time 
during the proceedings.34 Parties are increasingly using arbitrator challenges 
not as a method of ensuring the integrity and fairness of the proceedings, but 
rather as a technique of “procedural gamesmanship” to delay the proceedings 
or frustrate the opposing party.35 Frivolous arbitrator challenges have even 
been categorized as “guerilla tactics”—techniques used by a party incapable 
 
 29.  Nora Ciancio, The Implications of Recent ICSID Arbitrator Disqualifications for Latin 
America, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 440, 453 (2014). 
 30.  Arbitration Rules, supra note 23, at Rule 9(6). 
 31.  See infra Appendix 1. 
 32.  ICSID, 3 Proposals for Amendment of the ICSID Rules 154 (ICSID Working Paper # 1, 2018) 
[hereinafter WP # 1]. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See, e.g., ICSID, RULE AMENDMENT PROJECT – MEMBER STATE & PUBLIC COMMENTS ON 
WORKING PAPER # 1 OF AUGUST 3, 2018, at 224, 229 (2018), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/ 
Compendium_Comments_Rule_Amendment_3.15.19.pdf (listing Canada and Spain as Member States 
concerned with parties using arbitrator challenges as strategic tools to buy additional time). 
 35.  William T. O’Brien & Sandeep N. Nandivada, Arbitrator Challenges: Warranted or Abuse?, 
29 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. no. 10, 2014, at 29. 
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of presenting a strong case intended to avoid or delay confrontation by 
wearing down the other party or the members of the arbitral tribunal.36 One 
such example is the case of ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela, in which 
Venezuela brought six challenges against a single arbitrator over the period 
of four years.37 All of the challenges were dismissed, but many onlookers 
questioned whether Venezuela was misusing arbitrator challenges.38 
ICSID has provided two different alternatives for upgrading the process 
for arbitrator disqualification: Rule 29 and Article 21.39 Article 21 is an 
updated version of Rule 29, but changes in other articles in the proposal 
created changes in the rule number. 
C. Proposed New Rule: WP # 1 Rule 29 
In its various working papers, ICSID has provided several drafts of rules 
modifying the arbitrator disqualification process. The original proposal in 
WP # 1 Rule 29 eliminates the current Convention’s policy of an automatic 
suspension in the case of a request that an arbitrator be disqualified.40 It 
instead specifies that the proceedings will continue, unless the parties agree 
to suspend the proceedings.41 If the member in question is disqualified, either 
party may request that the reconstituted tribunal reconsider any order or 
decision issued by the tribunal while the proposal is pending.42 
Rule 29 also lays out time restrictions missing in the current provision. 
Under this new rule, a proposal for disqualification would have to be filed 
after the constitution of the tribunal and within twenty days after the later of 
either the tribunal’s constitution or the date on which the party challenging 
the arbitrator “first knew or first should have known of the facts on which 
the proposal is based.”43 
 
 36.  Preet Singh Oberoi, Understanding Guerilla Tactics in International Arbitration, 3 CHRIST U. 
L. J. 69, 73–74 (2014). 
 37.  Lucia Raimanova, Arbitrator Conflicts in a Global Era: Some Reflections on the Challenges in 
ConocoPhillips v Venezuela, as the Quantum Phase of the Case Nears Its Conclusion, PRAC. L. ARB. 
BLOG (Oct. 10, 2016), http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/arbitrator-conflicts-in-a-global-era-some-
reflections-on-the-challenges-in-conocophillips-v-venezuela-as-the-quantum-phase-of-the-case-nears-
its-conclusion. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  WP # 1, supra note 32, art. 29. Rule 29 is ICSID’s original proposal, presented in WP # 1. 
Article 21 is a revised version of the proposal, which is presented in WP # 2. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
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D. Proposed New Rule: WP # 2 Article 21 
The authors of the draft rules reversed course in Article 21 of WP # 2, 
replacing the language previously proposed in Rule 29. Article 21 
reinstituted the automatic suspension in the draft rule: “The proceedings 
shall be suspended until a decision on the proposal has been made, except to 
the extent that the parties agree to continue the proceeding in whole or in 
part.”44 This alteration was made in light of comments submitted by Member 
States and the public both in favor of and against the proposal and reverses 
the default rule in WP # 1. 45 Under WP # 1, the proceedings are continued 
unless the parties agree otherwise. In WP # 2, the proceedings are suspended 
unless the parties agree otherwise. As can readily be seen, the latter proposal 
would not prevent the use of an arbitrator challenge as a guerilla tactic, since 
the challenging party is unlikely to agree to carry on with the proceedings if 
the purpose of the challenge is to delay them. 
Comments in favor of the proposal tend to focus on the potential 
increase in efficiency, while comments against the proposal generally 
question the legitimacy of decisions made by a tribunal in which an arbitrator 
is later disqualified.46 In order to resolve concerns about legitimacy, some 
comments suggest that the tribunal eliminate the automatic suspension but 
give either party the ability to request that the reconstituted tribunal 
reconsider any actions made by the challenged arbitrator if that arbitrator is 
disqualified.47 As elaborated upon in Section IV, some question the 
efficiency of such an alteration, since reconsidering actions made by the 
disqualified arbitrator would increase the time and cost of the proceeding.48 
The WP # 2 proposal seems to represent a middle ground for ICSID, 
since the proposal maintains the current state of affairs by upholding the 
automatic suspension of proceedings while granting the parties ability to 
agree not to suspend the arbitration, either in part or in whole. Though similar 
to the current rule in that the preferred response is a suspension of the arbitral 
proceedings, the WP # 2 proposal varies from the current rule by granting 
the parties the autonomy to derogate from this automatic suspension and 
agree to continue with the proceedings. ICSID believes that this proposal 
would “allow the parties to agree to continue with all or part of the case 
schedule,” but also “ensure that a challenge has minimal impact on the 
 
 44.  WP # 2, supra note 3, art. 21. 
 45.  Id. at 141. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  ICSID, RULE AMENDMENT PROJECT, supra note 34, at 224–25 (comment received from Costa 
Rica). 
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overall time to complete the arbitration.”49 
WP # 2 Article 21, like the version proposed in WP # 1, lays out time 
restrictions that are missing in the current provision. However, this second 
proposal slightly lengthens the period a party has to file an arbitrator 
disqualification.50 
 
Table 1. Comparison of ICSID Rules on Proposals for Arbitrator 
Disqualification 




WP # 1 Rule 29 WP # 2 Article 
21 
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* Arbitration Rules, supra note 23, art. 9(6). 
** WP # 1, supra note 32, art. 29. 
*** WP # 2, supra note 3, art. 21. 
E. What Makes ICSID’s Arbitrator Challenge Process Different? 
The ICSID standard and process for dealing with arbitrator challenges 
vary in significant ways from the standard and process usually applied in 
international commercial arbitration. The processes differ in four main ways: 
 
 49.  WP # 2, supra note 3, at 142. 
 50.  Id. 
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whether arbitrator challenges are dealt with an automatic suspension of the 
proceedings, when challenges may be brought, who considers the 
challenges, and what standard is applied to the challenges. Despite 
differences between the two systems, the international commercial 
arbitration system is still instructive because it also allows for ad hoc party 
appointments.51 This means that parties in both systems select the 
adjudicators of their disputes, generally without reference to a list of pre-
approved arbitrators, a characteristic that is often touted in both systems 
because it supposedly guarantees that the parties are able to handpick 
adjudicators who have the legal knowledge and practical expertise most 
appropriate for the circumstances of each case.52 Furthermore, these 
similarities are not surprising, given that both arbitration systems are based 
on the same structural design.53 
Despite their similarities, the differences are perhaps more significant. 
The first major difference is that the vast majority other major arbitration 
rules do not provide for the automatic suspension of proceedings following 
an arbitrator challenge, but rather provide only for the possibility of 
suspension.54 The American Arbitration Association-International Centre for 
Dispute Resolution (ICDR-AAA), the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), and the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) rules do not mention suspension 
at all.55 On the other hand, the China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Rules specify that those challenged shall 
continue to serve on the tribunal until the CIETAC Chairman has made a 
final decision on the proposal for disqualification. The Hong Kong 
International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) Rules state that the proceeding 
may continue pending decision on the challenge.56 
 
 51.  MARIA NICOLE CLEIS, THE INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF ICSID ARBITRATORS 108 
(2017). 
 52.  Id. at 108–09. 
 53.  See ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS 2 (2014) (considering ICSID arbitration to be a form of 
commercial arbitration); Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species 
of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 139 (2006) (explaining that commercial arbitration 
rules served as a model for the structural design of ICSID arbitration). But see Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler, Foreword to ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID (2012) (“ICSID arbitration procedure 
was not based on commercial arbitration.”). 
 54.  Yarik Kryvoi, ICSID Arbitration Reform: Mapping Concerns of Users and How to Address 
Them, BRITISH INST. OF INT’L AND COMP. L. 4 (Nov. 30, 2018). 
 55.  ARIF H. ALI, JANE WESSEL, ALEXANDRE DE GRAMONT & RYAN MELLSKE, THE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULEBOOK: A GUIDE TO ARBITRAL REGIMES 325–31 (2019) (on file with 
author). 
 56.  Id. at 51. 
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The rules also differ in when arbitrator challenges may be brought. The 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Arbitration Rules of 2013 allow challenges to be brought whenever there are 
“justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.”57 
These challenges are assessed by the Appointing Authority, who is an 
individual either designated by parties in their agreement or the Secretary-
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.58 Past decisions on 
disqualifications have determined that the essential inquiry was into whether 
the specific circumstances could create a reasonable perception of a lack of 
impartiality or independence, not whether the Appointing Authority actually 
believed that the arbitrator is impartial or biased. Similarly, the SCC Rules 
allow for challenges in the same situation of justifiable doubts or when an 
arbitrator fails to meet any requirements the parties have agreed upon.59 
Furthermore, the Rules explicitly state that “every arbitrator must be 
impartial and independent.”60 Likewise, the LCIA Rules require that 
arbitrators be impartial and independent, and allow parties bring a challenge 
against an arbitrator “if circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to his impartiality or independence.”61 Meanwhile, the words 
“impartial” and independent” never appear in the ICSID Convention. Just 
like the UNCITRAL Rules, the SCC and LCIA Rules use an objective third-
person standard and do not require proof of the arbitrator’s actual 
independence or bias.62 
Unlike disqualification requests in other systems, those for ICSID are 
decided, or at least first considered, by the unchallenged members of the 
tribunal, which has had the subsequent effect of elevating the threshold that 
successful challenges must meet.63 This is a highly atypical approach in 
international arbitration, since most other international arbitration rules 
specify that the challenge decision will be made by either the arbitral 
institution or the appointing authority, which instead imitates the approach 
taken in the Statute of the International Court of Justice.64 The Kompetenz-
Kompetenz principle authorizes the tribunal to consider issues of its own 
 
 57.  UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 12, para. 1. (Dec. 16, 2013). 
 58.  Id. at art. 13, para. 4; art. 6, para. 1. 
 59.  ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES 
art. 19 (2017). 
 60.  Id. at art. 18(1). 
 61.  THE LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION RULES art. 10.1 (2014) 
(stating that “[a]n arbitrator may . . . be challenged by any party if circumstances exist that give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence”). 
 62.  CLEIS, supra note 51, at 143, n.781. 
 63.  Id. at 85. 
 64.  DAELE, supra note 13, 170. 
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competence, and this principle serves as the foundation of the practice of 
having the co-arbitrators decide arbitrator challenges.65 Even though a party 
to an ICSID dispute first filed an arbitrator challenge in 1982, the 
unchallenged arbitrators of the ICSID tribunal did not uphold a challenge 
against one of their peers until 2013.66 Having the remaining arbitrators 
decide against one of their peers is a difficult and uneasy position for those 
arbitrators, regardless of the case’s specific merits.67 The position is made 
even more difficult by the fact that most arbitrators know each other and 
have longstanding professional relationships with each other.68 Furthermore, 
since arbitrators are generally selected from a small group of qualified 
individuals, it is highly likely that many of the arbitrators who are asked to 
adjudicate a challenge have faced a challenge themselves.69 As of 2012, 
forty-three arbitrators had voted on challenges, and fourteen of them, or 
32.5% of them, had faced one themselves.70 This system of judgment by 
peers thereby raises the possibility that considerations extraneous to the 
case’s merits could affect the decision. It also increases the likelihood that 
arbitrators may raise the threshold required for upholding an arbitrator 
challenge because they do not want to disqualify a peer or because they fear 
being held to a higher standard if they are ever put in the same situation.71 
In Amco Asia v. Indonesia, the tribunal held that “[t]he challenging 
party must prove not only facts indicating the lack of independence, but also 
that the lack is ‘manifest’ or ‘highly probable,’ not just ‘possible’ or ‘quasi-
certain.’” In its decision, the tribunal cited a comment by scholar Christoph 
Scheuer about the “relatively heavy burden of proof” the term “manifest” 
places on the party attempting to disqualify an arbitrator.72 An ICSID 
tribunal specifically rejected the “reasonable doubt” test in OPIC Karimum 
v. Venezuela, holding that “it is not sufficient show an appearance of a lack 
 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Lukas Pfister, Who Decides Arbitrator Challenges? — A Comparative Analysis of Institutional 
Approaches, 15 SCHIEDSVZ, no. 4, 2017, at 164, 168. 
 67.  Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?, 35 U. 
PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 477 (2013). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id.; Daniel Robert Kalderimis, The Future of the ICSID Convention: Bigger, Better, Faster?, 
in ICSID CONVENTION AFTER 50 YEARS: UNSETTLED ISSUES 553, 571 (Christina Baltag ed., 2016). 
 70.  DAELE, supra note 13, at 173. 
 71.  Christine Meerah Kim, Issue Conflict in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Focusing on the 
Challenges against Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña in CC/Devas et al. v. India and Repsol v. 
Argentina, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 621, 640 (2014). 
 72.  Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of 
the Arbitral Tribunal, ¶¶ 34, 41 (Oct. 22, 2007). 
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of impartiality or independence.”73 This “manifest” standard is an objective 
standard, which must be based on reasonable evaluation by a third party.74 
Finally, different arbitral systems apply different standards to proposals 
for arbitrator disqualification. Although this is a discussion that is largely 
outside the scope of this paper, given that any change in the standard for 
disqualification was purposefully excluded from consideration in this 
amendment process, this notoriously high standard is a contributing factor to 
the low number of sustained challenges under ICISD Rules.75 The ICSID 
challenge process seems to take a more narrow and conservative approach 
than many other systems involved in investment-treaty dispute settlement, 
and there remains a perception that an arbitrator challenge is successful only 
if the disqualification proposal reveals something “rather shocking.”76 The 
ICSID standard for arbitrator disqualification has even been referred to as 
“notoriously” or “impossibly” high.77 
Such disqualifying conduct is in line with the original, Article 57, 
standard empowering a party to propose the disqualification of a member of 
the arbitral tribunal “on account of any fact indicating a manifest lack of 
qualities required by paragraph (1) of Article 14.”78 The original draft of the 
ICSID Convention produced by the General Counsel of the World Bank in 
June 1962 prescribed a much lower standard, expressed in Section 6(1) of 
Article VII of the document. This draft stated that a party could enter a 
proposal for an arbitrator disqualification “on the ground that he has an 
interest in the subject matter of the dispute or that he had, prior to his 
appointment, dealt with the dispute in any capacity whatever.”79 After many 
rounds of drafts and meetings, the staff of the World Bank issued a working 
paper in the fall of 1964 that became known as the “First Draft” of the 
Convention. The phrase “manifest lack of the qualities required by Article 
14(1),” currently used in Article 57, first appeared in Article 60 of this 
draft.80 
 
 73.  OPIC Karimum Corp. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/14, 
Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify Professor Philippe Sands, Arbitrator, ¶ 45 (May 5, 2011). 
 74.  Charles B. Rosenberg, Challenging Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 27 J. INT’L 
ARB. 505, 508 (2010). 
 75.  Am. Soc’y of Int’l L., Unfolding the Working Paper on ICSID Rules Amendment: Interview 
with Meg Kinnear, YOUTUBE (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.asil.org/resources/video/asil-events/. 
 76.  Kalderimis, supra note 69, at 571. 
 77. Id. at 570. 
 78.  Convention, supra note 15, art. 57. 
 79.  ICSID, 1 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND 
THE FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN 
STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 262 (1970). 
 80.  Id. 
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The meaning of this phrase was never explicitly discussed during the 
drafting process, but the five challenges that have been upheld shed light on 
the standard. The first challenge upheld was filed in 2005 in the case Pey 
Casado v. Chile.81  Although not instructive otherwise, the case did 
demonstrate that successful challenges were possible under this standard. On 
August 24, 2005, the Respondent filed a request for the disqualification of 
the entire tribunal.82 In response, one of the arbitrators, Galo Leoro Franco, 
resigned two days later.83 The respondent based its complaint on the fact that 
the tribunal had not made an arbitral award and did not seem to be close to 
making an award, even though the case had been filed six years earlier.84 
Following a request from the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative 
Council, Tjaco van den Hout, the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, recommended that the Chairman reject the proposal to 
disqualify Professor Pierre Lalive, but accept the proposal to disqualify 
Minister Mohammed Bedjaoui.85 The Chairman followed this advice exactly 
but did not provide any reasoning behind the decision.86 
The next arbitrator challenge to be upheld called into question the 
standard that had been applied in previous arbitrator challenges. The 
arbitrator challenge in Blue Bank v. Venezuela was filed in August 2013.87 
The respondent challenged arbitrator José María Alonso, who, at the time, 
was a managing partner of the litigation-and-arbitration department in the 
Madrid office of Baker & McKenzie, a member of the Steering Committee 
of the global-arbitration practice group, and a member of the Steering 
 
 81.  See id. (containing no explanation of the meaning of “manifest lack of qualities”). 
 82.  See generally Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/98/2, Respondent’s Request for the Disqualification of the Three Members of the Tribunal 
(Aug. 23, 2005). 
 83.  See generally Letter from Galo Leoro Franco, Arbitrator, to Monsieur Roberto Danino, 
Secretary General, ICSID (Aug. 26, 2005) (on file with ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2). 
 84.  See Victor Pey Casado, Respondent’s Request for the Disqualification of the Three Members 
of the Tribunal (stating that the arbitral claim was filed more than seven years ago, marking the longest 
time an ICSID case has been pending without an arbitral award or a judicial decision, although there is 
no reason to believe that a conclusion is imminent). 
 85.  Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/2, Recommendation of the PCA Secretary-General as to the Proposal for the Disqualification of 
Prof. Lalive and Judge Bedjaoi (Feb. 17, 2006). 
 86.  Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/2, Decision of the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council on the Disqualification of 
Prof. Lalive and Judge Bedjaoui (Feb. 21, 2006). 
 87.   ICSID, Case Details: Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. V. Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB 12/20), ICSID: WORLD BANK GROUP,  https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/12/20 (click “Procedural Details,” then see “(a) Original 
Proceeding” and “(b) Annulment Proceeding” on webpage to see two proceedings) (last visited October 
20, 2019). 
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Committee of the Baker & McKenzie International European Dispute 
Practice Group.88 Longreef Investments A.V.V. (Longreef) was a client of 
Baker & McKenzie at the time of the arbitration proceeding and was 
involved in a case against Venezuela.89 The respondent questioned Alonso’s 
independence and impartiality based on the fact that Baker & McKenzie, 
which has a global legal practice, represented Longreef in a different office, 
alleging that different offices cannot be considered separate for the purposes 
of an arbitrator challenge.90 It specifically argued that since Alonso was a 
member of global committees within the firm, part of his remuneration 
depended on the firm’s global profit, even if the remuneration from Longreef 
was minimal.91 
Alonso countered that the Baker & McKenzie offices were separate 
legal entities and that his remuneration as a partner would have changed 
either insignificantly or not at all based on the profit Baker & McKenzie New 
York and Caracas received from the Longreef v. Venezuela case.92 In 
assessing this challenge, the Chairman applied what was a lower threshold 
than in the majority of previous ICSID cases.93 The Chairman, Dr. Jim Yong 
Kim, stated that “Articles 57 and 14(1) of the ICSID Convention do not 
require proof of actual dependence or bias; rather it is sufficient to establish 
the appearance of dependence or bias.”94 Additionally, he defined the 
applicable standard as objective and “based on a reasonable evaluation of the 
evidence by a third party.”95 In applying the standard, the Chairman found 
that “a third party would find an evident or obvious appearance of lack of 
impartiality” in Alonso’s case.96 
The application of the “reasonable-third-party standard” continued in 
an arbitrator challenge filed that same year in Burlington Res. v. Republic of 
Ecuador. In this case, Ecuador filed the proposal for arbitrator 
disqualification against arbitrator Francisco Orrego Vicuña.97 Although 
 
 88.  Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/20, Decision on the Parties’ Proposals to Disqualify a Majority of the Tribunal, ¶ 23 
(Nov. 12, 2013). 
 89.  Id. at ¶ 22. 
 90.  Id. at ¶¶ 25–26. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at ¶¶ 39–40. 
 93.  Marc Lalonde, Chapter 46: Quo Vadis Disqualification? in BUILDING INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW: THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF ICSID 641, 646 (Meg Kinnear et al. eds., 2015). 
 94.  Blue Bank International & Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/20, Decision on the Parties’ Proposals to Disqualify a Majority of the Tribunal, ¶ 59 
(Nov. 12, 2013). 
 95.  Id. at ¶60. 
 96.  Id. at ¶ 69. 
 97.  See generally Burlington Res., Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 
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Ecuador had asked Orrego Vicuña to disclose all cases that he had accepted 
as arbitrator in which Freshfields was counsel, he did not disclose any such 
appointments since 2008, though he had been appointed in eight cases 
between 2007 and 2013.98 After discovering that Orrego Vicuña had, in fact, 
since been repeatedly appointed by Freshfields, Ecuador brought a proposal 
for disqualification arguing that the arbitrator had been appointed by 
Freshfields in an “unacceptably high number of cases,” that he had breached 
his obligation to disclose circumstances that could call his independence into 
question, and that he had exhibited “a blatant lack of impartiality to the 
detriment of Ecuador.”99 Freshfields had appointed Orrego Vicuña as an 
arbitrator in eight ICSID cases between 2007 and 2013, but Orrego Vicuña 
did not disclose his appointments in any of these cases.100 After applying the 
applicable legal standard of an “objective standard based on a reasonable 
evaluation of the evidence by a third party,” the Chairman found that a 
reasonable third party would find that Orrego Vicuña exhibited an 
appearance of a lack of impartiality.101 
The next case, Caratube v. Kazakhstan, marked the first time the two 
unchallenged arbitrators disqualified the third.102 In this case, the claimants 
challenged Bruno Boesch’s appointment, arguing that he “manifestly [could 
not] be independent and impartial” because he was serving as an arbitrator 
appointed by Kazakhstan in another related case, which relied on essentially 
the same factual allegations.103 After applying the same reasonable-third-
party standard used in Blue Bank, the remaining members of the tribunal 
found that they could not reasonably ask Boesch to “maintain a ‘Chinese 
wall’ in his own mind,” meaning that his understanding of the arbitration 
may be influenced by information he learned in the other arbitration.104 
The final case in which an arbitrator challenge has been upheld is Big 
Sky Energy Corp. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, but information about this 
challenge has not been made public. ICSID publishes all awards issued by 
an Arbitral tribunal with consent of the parties.105 Although the parties to this 
 
Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña (Dec. 13, 2013). 
 98.  Id. at ¶¶ 21, 25. 
 99.  Id. at ¶ 20. 
 100.  Id. at ¶¶ 21, 25. 
 101.  Id. at ¶¶ 67, 80. 
 102.  Chiara Giorgetti, Caratube v. Kazakhstan: For the First Time Two ICSID Arbitrators Uphold 
Disqualification of Third Arbitrator, 18 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 1 (Sept. 29, 2014). 
 103.  Caratube International Oil Co. LLP & Mr. Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 
ICSID Case No. ARB 13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. Bruno Boesch, ¶¶ 24–
26 (Mar. 20, 2014). 
 104.  Id. at ¶ 27. 
 105.  ICSID, Confidentiality and Transparency – ICSID Convention Arbitration, ICSID: WORLD 
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arbitration case did not agree to make the decision public, ICSID has still 
published a register of all proceedings.106 This case was filed in July 2017 
and is still pending.107 
III. DO THE RULES CREATE AN UNDUE TIME-AND-COST 
BURDEN? 
A. Does the Suspension of Proceedings Increase the Length and Cost of the 
Proceeding? 
The proposals regarding the process of arbitrator challenges aim at 
addressing the concern that ICSID arbitration is not sufficiently time nor cost 
effective.108 This mirrors similar concerns in the field. A survey compiled by 
the International Bar Association Arbitration Subcommittee on Investment 
Treaty Arbitration revealed that ninety-five percent of survey respondents 
were concerned about the duration of arbitration proceedings and the 
availability of arbitrator. Furthermore, a clear majority of respondents saw 
at least some concern with fees associated with attorneys, experts, and 
arbitrators.109 
Whether this is an issue warranting an amendment to the ICSID rules 
on arbitrator disqualifications merits asking a further question: whether such 
proposals for arbitrator disqualification as WP # 1 and WP # 2 ad so much 
of a burden to the proceedings in terms of cost and time as to justify 
eliminating the automatic suspension now in effect under Rule 9.110 
To determine the impact of arbitrator challenges, I compiled statistical 
tables, which are available in Appendices 1 and 2 of this Article. In doing 
so, I was able to determine the percentage of cases with challenges, the total 
amount of delay through challenge, and the success rate through challenges.  
ICSID provides procedural details on all cases that have been made public. 
After examining these cases, I made a list of every case in which an arbitrator 
had been challenged, the date the challenge was filed, and the date the 
challenge was resolved, either because the tribunal decided on the challenge, 
 
BANK GROUP, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Confidentiality-and-Transparency.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2019). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  ICSID, Case Details: Big Sky Energy Corp. v. Republic of Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/17/22) (ICSID Case No. ARB 17/22), ICSID WORLD BANK GROUP, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/ cases/casedetail.aspx?CaseNo=ARB/17/22 (last visited Oct. 27, 
2019). 
 108.  Am. Soc’y of Int’l L., supra note 75. 
 109.  IBA ARBITRATION SUBCOMM. ON INV. TREATY ARIBTRATION, INT’L BAR ASS’N, 
CONSISTENCY, EFFICIENCY AND TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 1, 36 (2018). 
 110.  WP # 1, supra note 32. 
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the challenging party withdrew the proposal for disqualification, the 
proceeding was discontinued, or the challenged arbitrator resigned. In doing 
so, I counted a challenge to multiple members of the tribunal or the entire 
tribunal in order to identify the total number of challenges separately. I 
calculated the time between these dates to determine the total amount of time 
the arbitrator challenge delayed the proceedings. These statistics are 
compiled in Appendix 1 of this Article. 
In the calculus resulting in Appendix 1, I had counted a challenge to 
multiple members of the tribunal or the entire tribunal in order to identify the 
total number of challenges separately. But because the total time delay did 
not increase and therefore did not add any additional time burden if the 
challenges overlapped, I compiled a list in Appendix 2 simply calculating 
the total amount of delay, without regard to the number of separate 
challenges. 
ICSID had registered 735 cases under the ICSID Convention and 
Additional Facility Rules as of April 26, 2019, and eighty-five of those cases 
have had at least one arbitrator challenge. Some of these cases have had 
multiple challenges, resulting in a total of 146 arbitrator challenges.111 The 
fact that 11.6% of the total cases have been slowed down by arbitrator 
challenges supports the idea that incentives for raising the complaint are high 
for parties who simply want to delay the challenge, because a challenge at 
an advanced stage in the arbitration involves significant disruption and 
prejudice.112 An estimated sixty-eight percent of these challenges have been 
made to one member of the tribunal, but the number of challenges to most or 
all of the tribunal and multiple challenges in a single case, sometimes with 
respect to the same arbitrator, is increasing.113 
This trend mirrors the increase in the number of cases overall. By using 
data provided by the ICSID Secretary-General, made publicly available on 
the ICSID website, and published in an annual ICSID report on caseload, the 
below graph compares the number of challenges per year to the total number 
of cases filed with ICSID each year.114 
 
 111.  ICSID, supra note 9. 
 112.   Daele, supra note 13, at 103. This disruption comes from the fact that highly in-demand 
arbitrators may not be able to reschedule the time-consuming hearing on short notice and from the fact 
that, if an arbitrator resigns or is disqualified, some parts of the hearing may need to be repeated for the 
newly-constituted tribunal. The arbitrators may be prejudiced against one party due to frustration created 
by the disruption and delay. Id. at 104. 
 113.  Kinnear, supra note 18, at 412. Neither of these challenges for arbitrator disqualification were 
made public. 
 114.  See ICSID, supra note 9, at 7; Kinnear & Nitschke, supra note 13; ICSID, Advanced Search, 
ICSID: WORLD BANK GROUP, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/ AdvancedSearch.aspx (last 
visited May 3, 2019). 
PITA FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  1:46 PM 
184 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 30:163 
Table 2. Number of Challenges Filed Per Year Compared to Total 
Number of Cases Filed Per Year 
 
The first arbitrator challenge was filed in Amco v. Indonesia in 1982, 
but the next challenge was not filed until sixteen years later in Pey Casado 
v. Chile.115 When Amco was decided upon, parties had filed only two cases 
with ICSID.116 By the time Pey Casado was adjudicated, ICSID had about 
ten new cases being filed each year, but arbitrator challenges were still few 
and far between.117  
The increase in arbitrator challenges is a result of the increasing 
complexity of international arbitration and parties using challenges as a 
strategy to disrupt the arbitration.118 The fact situations and legal questions 
presented in arbitrations continue to increase in both complexity and 
number.119 Again, parties are increasingly using arbitrator challenges to 
delay the proceedings or frustrate the opposing party.120 We cannot do much 
about the increasing complexity, but we can reduce the incentives or avenues 
 
 115.  Kinnear, supra note 18, at 412. 
 116.  See supra Table 2. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  See Pallavi Shroff, Due Process in International Arbitration: Balancing Procedural Fairness 
and Efficiency, in 19 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW: CONTRIBUTION AND 
CONFORMATION 797, 805 (Andrea Menaker ed., 2017). 
 119.  Kinnear, supra note 18, at 416. 
 120.  O’Brien & Nandivada, supra note 35, at 1. 
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for parties to pursue disruptive tactics. Accordingly, the scope of this Article 
is not about the increasing complexity, but this complexity almost certainly 
does have an effect on the total number of changes. 
Additionally, more potential conflicts have arisen as the overall number 
of arbitrators has increased. This increase in conflicts comes in part from the 
fact that the available pool of arbitrators has not grown at the same rate as 
the overall number of arbitrations, generally leading parties to nominate 
arbitrators from the same small pool of qualified individuals.121 The small 
community of investment arbitration professionals and the dual roles of 
arbitrators, with arbitrators acting simultaneously as counsel, arbitrator, or 
expert witness in other investment cases, have become characteristic features 
of the ICSID system.122 A potential arbitrator’s previous familiarity with a 
party or counsel, the subject matter of the case, or the legal issues in that case 
are often factors that the nominating party considers, and can even weigh in 
favor of that arbitrator’s selection.123 These characteristics increase the 
number of conflicts that can potentially be raised in ICSID arbitrations. But, 
the fact that an arbitrator has faced similar legal or factual issues in other 
cases is not sufficient to prove bias.124 
Although proposals for arbitrator disqualification have been as brief as 
only one day, as seen in Olguín v. Paraguay, this is usually the exception—
the typical delay is much longer.125 The range of delay extends to a high of 
260 days in Carnegie Minerals (Gambia) Ltd. v. Republic of The Gambia.126 
A proposal for disqualification of an arbitrator takes eighty-one days, or 
 
 121.  C. Mark Baker & Lucy Greenwood, Are Challenges Overused in International Arbitration?, 
30 J. OF INT’L ARB. 101, 103 (2013); Giorgetti, supra note 67, at 438. 
 122.  CLEIS, supra note 51, at 86. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.   Universal Compression Int’l Holdings, S.L.U. v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/9, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify Prof. Brigitte Atern and Prof. Guido 
Santiago Tawil, Arbitrators, ¶  83 (May 10, 2011) (“The international investment arbitration framework 
would cease to be viable if an arbitrator was disqualified simply for having faced similar factual or legal 
issues in other arbitrations.”). 
 125.  See Señor Eudoro Armando Olguín v. República del Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, 
Award (July 26, 2001). This case had such a brief delay because the arbitrator immediately resigned 
following the filing of the proposal for arbitration disqualification. 
 126.  Id. at  ¶ 15–16. See also ICSID, Case Details: Carnegie Minerals (Gambia) Limited v. Republic 
of The Gambia (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/19), ICSID: WORLD BANK GROUP, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail. aspx?CaseNo=ARB%2f09%2f19 (last visited 
May 17, 2019). The delay in Utsch M.O.V.E.R.S. Int’l v. Arab Republic of Egypt was technically longer, 
at 851 days, but the parties agreed to suspend the proceedings during the midst of this arbitrator challenge, 
making this case an unusual scenario. See ICSID, Case Details: Utsch M.O.V.E.R.S. International GmbH, 
Erich Utsch Aktiengesellschaft, and Helmut Jungbluth v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/13/37), ICSID: WORLD BANK GROUP, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/casedetail.aspx? 
CaseNo=ARB%2f13%2f37 (last visited May 17, 2019). 
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almost three months, on average. Because twenty-five cases with a proposal 
for disqualification actually involved multiple arbitrator challenges, a case 
that involves at least one proposal for disqualification is delayed for an 
average of 103 days, or almost three and half months.127 These delays are 
added onto proceedings that are already lengthy. Data from between 2013 
and 2017 indicates that an average investment arbitration case involving a 
challenge lasts 4.3 years.128 
Even before arbitrator challenges arise, the cost involved in the 
investment arbitration process has already increased.129 According to a 
survey conducted by attorneys at Allen & Overy, mean claimant-party costs 
were 4.4 million U.S. dollars, and mean-respondent party costs were 4.6 
million U.S. dollars at the end of 2012.130 The attorneys conducted the survey 
again in 2017, employing the same methodology to determine the costs of 
arbitration post-2013, and determined that costs had increased by sixty-eight 
percent for claimants and thirteen percent for respondents, resulting in mean 











 127.  See infra Appendix 2. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See infra Table 2. 
 130.  Matthew Hodgson & Alastair Campbell, Damages and Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration 
Revisited, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Dec. 14, 2017, at 2, http://www.allenovery.com/ 
SiteCollectionDocuments/141217Damagesandcostsininvestmenttreatyarbitrationrevisited.pdf. 
 131.  Id. 
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* The estimate for average party costs refers to the fees and expenses of 
counsel, experts, and witnesses. 
** The estimate for average tribunal costs refers to the fees and expenses of 
arbitrators and ICSID institutional charges. 
B. Does the Extra Time and Cost Pay Off in the Form of Successful 
Challenges? 
Although the arbitrator challenges often create extensive delays and 
cost increases, this typically does not have any effect on the tribunal’s 
constitution, as these proposals for disqualification are rarely successful. Of 
the 146 arbitrator challenges that have been made public, only five have been 
upheld.133 In 106 cases, the arbitrator challenge was declined, leaving only a 
delayed proceeding and an increased total cost for the parties.134 Though 
some of these challenges may have been an attempt on the part of one of the 
parties to ensure the independence and impartiality of the tribunal, with only 
3.4% of arbitrator challenges actually being upheld, there is a concern that 
many of these proposals for disqualification are merely frivolous challenges 
intended to exhaust or frustrate counterparties.135 
The low success rate of challenges in the ICSID stands in stark contrast 
to the success rate in other major international arbitral systems. Many of 
these institutions do not publish their challenge decisions, but some general 
trends are still known.136 At UNCITRAL, thirty to forty percent of arbitrator 
 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  See infra Appendix 1. 
 134.  Id. Of the other cases, one arbitrator challenge is currently pending and two arbitrator 
challenges were never decided upon because the proceedings were discontinued. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  CLEIS, supra note 51, at 111. 
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challenges have been successful.137 The LCIA has published some 
anonymized summaries of arbitrator challenges decided by the court 
between 1996 and 2017, which show that challenges were made in less than 
two percent of the cases before the court and were successful, either in whole 
or in part, in only about twenty-three percent of those cases.138 This shows 
that ICSID challenges are less likely to succeed than challenges under the 
rules of most other international arbitration institutions.139 From 2013 to 
2015, the SCC made thirteen decisions on arbitrator challenges, excluding 
decisions made in still-ongoing arbitrations, and upheld four of them, or 
thirty-one percent.140 It is not clear how many cases have come before the 
SCC because arbitrations before the institution are confidential.141 
Furthermore, the ICC allows for the examination of an individual’s 
independence and impartiality both when they are appointed for a position 
as an arbitrator and then during the proceeding if they are challenged by one 
of the parties.142 The majority of challenges raised at the time of the 
appointment result in non-confirmation.143 
IV. DOES THE PROPOSED RULE SOLVE THE PROBLEM? 
Adopting Rule 29 proposed in WP # 1 would be a substantial step 
towards increasing the efficiency of ICSID arbitrations and decreasing the 
length of ICSID arbitrations by weeks or even months. Not only will the 
number of challenges decrease, but the challenges that are brought will be 
less disruptive. Despite what some commentators have argued, the current 
time limits—and those proposed in WP # 2—are not sufficient to prevent 
extensive delays. Additionally, the negative impact of adopting WP # 1 
would be minimal, and it would not call into question the legitimacy of 
decisions made by the tribunal as much as some critics believe. 
 
A. Rule 29 Would Decrease the Overall Number of Challenges. 
Under this rule, an average delay of eighty-one days for every arbitrator 
challenge would be a concern of the past, a notable improvement considering 
 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Philip Clifford, Hanna Roos & Eleanor Scogings, Arbitrator Challenges: The Long View, 2018 
NEW L. J. 15, 15 (2018). 
 139.  Baker & Greenwood, supra note 121, at 110. 
 140.  ANJA HAVEDAL, STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INST., SCC PRACTICE NOTE: SCC 
BOARD DECISIONS ON CHALLENGES TO ARBITRATORS 2013-2015 at 5–9 (2016), https://sccinstitute.com/ 
media/176447/scc-decisions-on-challenges-to-arbitrators-2013-2015.pdf. 
 141.  CLEIS, supra note 51, 125. 
 142.  Id. at 132–33. 
 143.  Id. at 136. 
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that even the current ICSID Secretary-General anticipates that the number of 
arbitrator challenges will only continue to rise.144 Adopting this proposal will 
eliminate the incentives that parties have to bring challenges simply to delay 
the proceeding, thereby decreasing the overall number of challenges. 
Such delaying tactics, brought to frustrate the opposing party and delay 
the proceedings, account for the high number of arbitrator challenges and the 
resulting low—3.4 percent—success rate. With such a low success rate, 
many parties must file proposals for disqualification knowing they have a 
slim chance of winning. However, the delay and frustration to the other party 
created by the challenge may be worth the increase in cost. Eliminating the 
automatic suspension of the proceedings would erase this incentive, leading 
to fewer overall challenges. 
B. Rule 29 Would Reduce the Number of Arbitrators That Resign After a 
Party Files an Arbitrator Challenge Against Them. 
An ancillary benefit of the decreasing number of challenges is a 
subsequent decrease in the number of resignations: the 3.4% of unsuccessful 
challenges does not tell the entire story of arbitrator challenges. In twenty-
eight of these cases, or nineteen percent of total arbitrator challenges, the 
challenged arbitrator resigned after the proposal for disqualification was 
filed.145 A challenge that casts doubts on an arbitrator’s impartiality and 
independence can have significant negative impacts on an arbitrator’s 
reputation, even if the challenge is ultimately rejected.146 In contrast, there 
are also some situations in which an arbitrator appears to collude with a party 
to resign in bad faith.147 Charles Brower, an individual who has served as an 
arbitrator in a multitude of cases and has been challenged six times, has been 
asked to resign because a party did not want to finance challenge 
proceedings.148 He states that it is important for arbitrators to speak with the 
party that appointed them and offer to resign.149 Brower has also resigned 
before, at the appointing party’s request, so that the party that appointed him 
could adhere to other agreements and to ensure that no future award could 
be challenged on the grounds that the tribunal was not properly 
constituted.150 Although there seems to be a connection between the 
 
 144.  Kinnear, supra note 18, at 416. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Pfister, supra note 66, at 166. 
 147.  Judith Levine, “Late-in-the Game” Arbitrator Challenges and Resignations, 108 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 419, 423 (2014). 
 148.  Charles N. Brower, Remarks by Charles N. Brower, 108 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 423, 427 
(2014). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 426. 
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resignations and the proposals for arbitrator disqualifications, it is unclear 
how much of this related to the merits of the proposal instead of a 
conciliatory attitude of the challenged arbitrator.151 
With a lower number of challenges altogether, there will be fewer 
opportunities for arbitrators to resign. Nineteen percent of challenges 
currently cause an arbitrator to resign. This is an unfavorable outcome, since 
it is unclear how many of these arbitrators would actually be disqualified if 
the tribunal had an opportunity to decide on the disqualification proposal. 
Having its first-choice arbitrator resign without sufficient concerns with their 
independence and impartiality deprives a party of its autonomy, which is one 
of the biggest reasons that parties enter into investment arbitration. 
C. The Challenges that Rule 29 Would Not Eliminate Would Be Less 
Disruptive to the Arbitral Proceedings Than Those Allowed Under the 
Current Rule. 
 Furthermore, the challenges that are still brought would not be nearly 
as disruptive, since the enormous delay that many proposals for 
disqualification create will be eliminated with the deletion of the automatic-
suspension provision. Many Member States recognized this potential for 
increased efficiency in their public written comments and therefore 
supported the WP # 1 proposal, with or without a slight modification.152 Both 
Australia and Austria, for example, explicitly expressed the opinion that the 
elimination of the automatic suspension of proceedings would minimize “the 
disruptive effects” that the current rules create.153 The European Union also 
saw “merit” in ICSID’s efforts to speed up procedures by eliminating the 
automatic suspension.154 
D. WP # 2’s Term Limits Do Not Eliminate the Need for Rule 29’s 
Continuation of the Proceedings. 
 In a public comment, Guglielmino Derecho Internacional, a law firm 
located in Argentina, argues that eliminating the automatic suspension of 
proceedings is unnecessary when the new rule also establishes fixed and 
short terms to make suspension during the qualification decision 
insignificant.155 However, WP # 2’s new time limits narrowing the window 
in which a party can file a proposal for arbitrator disqualification are not 
 
 151.  DAELE, supra note 13, at 105. 
 152.  ICSID, RULE AMENDMENT PROJECT, supra note 34, at 224, 226, 229 (comments from Canada, 
the European Union, and Singapore). 
 153.  Id. at 221–23 (comments from Australia and Austria). 
 154.  Id. at 226 (comment from the European Union). 
 155.  Id. at 232 (comment from Guglielmino). 
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sufficient for combatting the extensive delay arbitrator challenges create. 
Even with these limitations, a delay can last weeks or months while the 
remaining arbitrators—or, if necessary, the Chairman—decides on the 
arbitrator proposal. Additionally, with many cases now involving multiple 
challenges to arbitrators, adhering to these fixed and short terms can add 
weeks or months to the time of the proceeding. For example, Conoco Phillips 
v. Argentina had eight different arbitrator challenges.156 This resulted in a 
total delay of 403 days, or just over thirteen months.157 Pey Casado v. Chile 
saw the most proposals for disqualification with nine arbitrator challenges, 
although not all separate, which were made over a span of nineteen years.158 
The proceedings were suspended for 351 days because of arbitrator 
challenges, and this number does not include the first two challenges, the 
time frames of which were not made public.159 
E. Adopting Rule 29 Would Not Call into Question the Legitimacy of the 
Tribunal’s Decisions. 
 Finally, Member States, including Canada, Costa Rica, and Mexico, 
and public commentators, such as Guglielmino, have expressed concern that 
adopting WP # 1 might impact the legitimacy of the tribunal, since arbitrators 
would still be able to discuss jurisdiction and merits of the case while the 
proposal for disqualification is still pending.160 For example, Argentina 
called it “highly inappropriate” to allow the proceeding to continue pending 
a decision on an arbitrator challenge.161 However, this concern should not 
prevent ICSID from adopting WP # 1’s proposal for three main reasons: 1) 
WP # 1 would still increase efficiency overall, 2) ICSID has not experienced 
questions of legitimacy in proceedings that have continued, and 3) other 
arbitral institutions have not experienced problems with legitimacy. 
 Although the legitimacy of the tribunal may be a concern in those cases 
in which the arbitrator challenge is upheld, those cases are so few as to be 
negligible: only 3.5% of those challenges are successful. These concerns 
 
 156.  See infra Appendix 1. 
 157.  See infra Appendix 2. 
 158.  See infra Appendix 1. 
 159.  See infra Appendix 2. 
 160.  ICSID, RULE AMENDMENT PROJECT, supra note 34, at 231–32 (comment from Guglielmino). 
See id. at 224 (“Canada . . . is concerned that [eliminating the automatic suspension] could affect the 
perceived legitimacy of the tribunal in the period in question.”); id. at 225 (comment from Costa Rica) 
(“[T]he continuation of the process could affect its legitimacy.”); id. at 228 (comment from Mexico) 
(stating that although it is desirable to decrease the number of arbitrator challenges intending to delay the 
arbitral proceedings, it is also important to guarantee the integrity of the proceedings in the case where 
arbitrator challenges are appropriate). 
 161. Id. at 221 (comment from the Argentine Republic). 
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could be completely alleviated by a slight modification to WP # 1, as 
recommended by Canada, which would allow either party to ask the tribunal 
to review any decisions in which a disqualified arbitrator was involved. As 
Colombia and Guatemala recognize, this would require an increased delay 
in those cases where the proposal for disqualification was upheld.162 
However, the increase in delay would be significantly outweighed by the 
decrease in delay seen in the vast majority of cases in which the proposal for 
arbitrator disqualification is declined. Again, only 3.5% of challenges are 
successful; still others would be relatively minor and not material to the case, 
so those, too, would not need to be reconsidered. This leaves few instances 
in which any decisions would have to be reconsidered, with a resulting delay. 
On the other hand, under WP # 1 the vast majority of cases would see a 
significant improvement in efficiency. Singapore recognized the disparity 
between the number of successful arbitrator challenges and the number of 
total challenges and noted the proposed elimination of the automatic 
suspension “is more likely than not to increase the efficiency of the 
disqualification process.”163  Even the delay in the cases where an arbitrator 
was disqualified could be minimized if the parties agreed to suspend the 
proceedings, which may happen when both parties realize that there could 
be an issue with an arbitrator’s impartiality and independence. 
 Some parties have decided to continue with proceedings even under the 
current rule, and none of these cases has experienced major concerns with 
legitimacy. This is permissible under Article 44 of the Convention, which 
allows parties to agree to deviate from ICSID Rules.164 In Salini v. Jordan, 
the parties continued with the previously scheduled session of the arbitration 
proceeding even after one of the parties filed an arbitrator challenge.165 They 
met informally during this session to agree on procedural issues such as 
bifurcation of the proceeding and the schedule for the submission of written 
proceedings.166 After the challenged arbitrator resigned, the reconstituted 
Tribunal was presented with and adopted the procedural agreements that had 
 
 162.  Id. at 224 (stating that the fact that the tribunal may continue during arbitral challenges could 
affect the proceeding’s efficiency if one of the parties asked for review of the proceedings and the  
decision was made while the arbitrator challenge was being assessed); id. at 226 (listing Guatemala’s 
comment that the possibility that the parties could ask the tribunal to consider anything resolved by a 
disqualified arbitrator does not make continuing proceedings during arbitrator challenges more efficient). 
 163.  Id. at 229 (comment from Singapore). 
 164.  See Convention, supra note 15, art. 44. The Article reads: 
Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section 
and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on 
the date on which the parties consented to the arbitration. 
 165.  DAELE, supra note 13, at 102–03. 
 166.  Id. 
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already been reached.167 In Carnegie v. Gambia, the party filing the 
challenge to the arbitrator stated that it did not want the proposal for 
disqualification to interrupt the proceedings.168 Accordingly, both parties 
filed briefs on the merits of the case, which meant that no changes were made 
to the timetable to which the parties had originally agreed.169 
 The fact that these cases were able to successfully continue with 
proceedings despite an arbitrator challenge suggests that eliminating the 
automatic suspension will not affect the tribunal’s legitimacy—in the 
interim, parties can successfully take care of both procedural and substantive 
matters. Part of the reason for this is that arbitrator challenges typically occur 
early in the proceedings.170 Facing these challenges earlier in the proceedings 
makes it even less likely that a challenged arbitrator who is later disqualified 
will take part in deciding on a matter that will call into question the tribunal’s 
legitimacy. 
 Finally, as previously mentioned, the vast majority of other major 
arbitral institution do not provide for an automatic suspension of the 
proceedings.171 None of these other arbitral institutions have faced major 
legitimacy problems; therefore, ICSID should not prioritize these 
unsubstantiated concerns over the efficiency problems it is currently facing. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 In light of these considerations, ICSID should adopt a slightly modified 
version of the WP # 1 proposal. ICSID should eliminate the automatic 
suspension of the proceedings, but it should add to the provision a clause that 
requires the newly constituted tribunal to reevaluate any decisions in which 
a disqualified arbitrator was involved, if the arbitrator challenge is 
successful, in order to minimize concerns with legitimacy. 
 ICSID has rightly decided to address the concerns with efficiency that 
many Member States have started to express. The data in this Article show 
that arbitrator challenges are a notable source of inefficiency within the rules. 
The rules for arbitrator challenges have remained largely untouched for fifty-
one years. ICSID has the opportunity to promulgate rules that will make a 




 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. at 103. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  See Kinnear & Frauke Nitschke, supra note 13. 
 171.  Kryvoi, supra note 54, at 4. 
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V. APPENDIX 1: ICSID PROPOSALS FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF 














1999 Resigned 1 





2005 Resigned 3 
Nations 
Energy, Inc. 


















2016 Resigned 6 
Sociedad 
Aeroportuaria 
v. Republic of 
Peru 
Jan. 15, 
2019 Jan. 22, 2019 Resigned 7 
ALAS Int’l 
Baustoffproduk




2007 Dec. 4, 2007 Withdrawn 7 
Pey Casado v. 
Chile (6)* 
Jan. 6, 




2007 Oct. 22, 2007 Declined 7 
 
 172.  Each proposal for disqualification of an arbitrator is listed separately. If a party filed proposals 
for disqualification of multiple or all members of the tribunal at the same time and the proposals were 
dealt with in the same time frame, the proposals are still listed separately. 
 173.  Data compiled using records made public by ICSID. Cases whose procedural details were not 
made public are not included in this table, even if the case included an arbitrator challenge. The length of 
delay was measured from the time the proposal of disqualification was filed to the time the tribunal 
decided on the case or the challenged arbitrator announced his or her resignation. 
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2006 July 7, 2006 Resigned 15 
S&T Oil 
Equip. & 
Mach. Ltd. v. 
Romania 
Apr. 9, 






2012 Feb. 27, 2012 Resigned 17 
Raiffeisen 






2018 Declined 17 
AS PNB Banka 












2016 Declined 18 
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2015 Declined 20 
STEAG GmbH 





2018 Declined 22 
Blue Bank v. 
Argentina (1) 
Aug. 16, 
2013 Sept. 9, 2013 Resigned 24 


















2002 Declined 27 
Mathias Kruck 






































2014 Apr. 30, 2014 Declined 32 
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The Loewen 





2001 Resigned 32 
RSM Prod. 
Corp. v. Saint 
Lucia 
Sept. 19, 













2017 Oct. 24, 2017 Resigned 36 
Alpiq AG v. 
Romania 
Apr. 24, 









2001 Oct. 3, 2001 Declined 40 
Gran Colombia 


























2011 Resigned 43 




2008 Apr. 26, 2008 Declined 43 
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Samsung 
Engineering 




2018 Apr. 28, 2018 Declined 44 
Tethyan 










2013 Feb. 4, 2014 Declined 47 
Abaclat v. 
Argentine 
Repulic  (4) 
Dec. 19, 






















2016 Declined 49 
Pey Casado v. 
Chile (8)** 
Feb. 23, 
2017 Apr. 13, 2017 Declined 49 
Tanzania Elec. 
Supply Co. 















2015 June 4, 2015 Declined 50 
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2014 Upheld 51 




2018 Mar. 2, 2018 Declined 53 
Burlington Res. 
v. Ecuador (2) 
Jan. 8, 
2018 Mar. 2, 2018 Declined 53 
Burlington Res. 
v. Ecuador (3) 
Jan. 8, 
2018 Mar. 2, 2018 Declined 53 
Burlington Res. 
v. Ecuador (4) 
Jan. 8, 
2018 Mar. 2, 2018 Declined 53 
BSG Res. Ltd. 





2016 Declined 54 
BSG Res. Ltd. 





2016 Declined 54 
BSG Res. Ltd. 










2014 May 5, 2014 Declined 55 
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2010 Declined 55 
Ickale Insaat 
Ltd. Sirketi v. 
Turkmenistan 
May 16, 
2014 July 11, 2014 Declined 56 
Tethyan 




































2011 Declined 66 
Flughafen 





2017 Feb. 19, 2018 Declined 68 
Champion 




2016 Jan. 18, 2017 Declined 68 
Tethyan 
Copper Co. v. 
Islamic 
Nov. 25, 
2017 Feb. 5, 2018 Declined 73 
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2017 Feb. 5, 2018 Declined 73 
Tethyan 
























2016 Mar. 7, 2017 Declined 74 
KS Invest and 
TLS Invest v. 
Spain 
Feb. 14, 
























2007 June 5, 2007 Declined 78 
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2011 Jan. 24, 2012 Declined 78 
Quiborax v. 
Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
(1) 
Apr. 7, 
2010 Jul. 6, 2010 Declined 80 
Quiborax v. 
Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
(2) 
Apr. 7, 
2010 Jul. 6, 2010 Declined 80 
Quiborax v. 
Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 
(3) 
Apr. 7, 





2009 Dec. 8, 2009 Resigned 80 




2015 Nov. 9, 2015 Declined 84 
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2017 Mar. 9, 2018 Declined 86 





















2015 Declined 95 
Nations 
Energy, Inc. 




2011 Sept. 7, 2011 Declined 96 









































2009 Declined 110 
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Gabonese 
Republic 
Pey Casado v. 
Chile (7)** 
Nov. 22, 




























































2011 Feb. 27, 2012 Declined 145 
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2008 Declined 164 
Pey Casado v. 
Chile (4) 
Aug. 24, 
2005 Feb. 21, 2006 Declined 181 
Pey Casado v. 
Chile (5) 
Aug. 24, 




























2008 Declined 209 
Supervision y 
Control S.A. v. 
Republic of 
Costa Rica (1) 
July 20, 
2015 Mar. 7, 2016 Declined 231 
Supervision y 
Control S.A. v. 
July 20, 
2015 Mar. 7, 2016 Declined 231 
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Republic of 
Costa Rica (2) 
Supervision y 
Control S.A. v. 
Republic of 
Costa Rica (3) 
July 20, 























2017* Withdrawn 851 
Tanzania Elec. 
Supply Co. 










v. Kingdom of 
Spain (2)**** 
Apr. 16, 










Amco v.  
Indonesia Not public 
June 24, 
1982 Declined Unknown 
Zhinvali v. 
Georgia Not public Jan. 19, 2001 Declined Unknown 
Salini v. Jordan 
Apr. 8, 
2003 Not public Resigned Unknown 
Pey Casado v. 
Chile (1) Not public Oct. 21, 1998 Resigned Unknown 
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Pey Casado v. 
Chile (2) Not public 
Mar. 16, 
2001 Resigned Unknown 
Corn Products 
Int’l, Inc. v. 
United 
Mexican States Not public May 3, 2004 Resigned Unknown 
* This challenge took place during a resubmission proceeding of the 
original award. 
** This challenge took place during an annulment proceeding of the 
original award. 
*** This challenge took place during an interpretation proceeding of the 
original award. 
**** As of Apr. 26, 2019, this proposal had not yet been decided upon and 
the proceeding was still suspended. 
VI. APPENDIX 2: ICSID CASES INVOLVING A PROPOSAL FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION OF AN ARBITRATOR174 ORGANIZED BY 
LENGTH OF TOTAL DELAY TO CASE175 
Case Days of Delay 
Olguin v. Paraguay 1 
African Holding v. Congo 6 
ALAS Int’l Baustoffproduktions AG v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 7 
Sociedad Aeroportuaria v. Republic of Peru 7 
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. United 
Republic of Tanzania 8 
CEMEX v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 11 
Electricidad Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic 15* 
S&T Oil Equip. & Mach. Ltd. v. Romania 15 
AS PNB Banka v. Republic of Latvia 17 
Raiffeisen Bank Int’l v. Republic of Croatia 17 
RSM Prod. Corp. v. Central African Republic** 17 
Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic 20 
STEAG GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain 22 
 
 174.  This chart reflects the total delay any case with at least one proposal for disqualification of an 
arbitrator was filed. Proposals that the tribunal considered simultaneously did not count multiple times 
towards the total delay. 
 175.  Data compiled using records made public by ICSID. Cases whose procedural details were not 
made public are not included in this table, even if the case included an arbitrator challenge. The length of 
delay was measured from the time the proposal of disqualification was filed to the time the tribunal 
decided on the case or the challenged arbitrator announced his or her resignation. The length of delay 
does not include the time required to reconstitute the tribunal if the arbitrator resigned or was disqualified. 
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Rail World v. Estonia 24 
Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine  25 
SGS v. Pakistan 27 
Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela 31 
Mathias Kruck v. Kingdom of Spain 31*** 
The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States 32 
RSM Prod. Corp. v. Saint Lucia 34 
SolEs Badajoz GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain 36 
Alpiq AG v. Romania 38 
Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal v. Argentine Republic** 40 
Gran Colombia Gold Corp. v. Republic of Colombia 40 
Alpha Projektholding v. Ukraine 42 
City-State N.V. v. Ukraine 43 
Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey 43 
TECO Guatemala Holdings, LLC v. Republic of 
Guatemala 43 
Samsung Engineering Co., Ltd. v. Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia 44 
Interocean v. Nigeria 48 
Tanzania Elec. Supply Co. Ltd. v. Indep. Power 
Tanzania Ltd.**** 49* 
Mobil Exploration and Mobile Argentina v. Argentine 
Republic 50 
Caratube and Hourani v. Kazakhstan  51 
CEAC Holdings v. Montenegro 51 
BSG Res. Ltd. v. Republic of  Guinea 54 
Tidewater v. Venezuela 55 
Ickale Insaat Ltd. Sirketi v. Turkmenistan 56 
Electrabel v. Hungary  66 
Elitech v. Republic of  Croatia 66 
Champion Holding Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt 68 
Flughafen Zurich A.G. v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela** 68 
Getma v. Guinea 74 
Iskandar Safa and Akram Safa v. Hellenic Republic 74 
Saipem v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh 74 
KS Invest and TLS Invest v. Spain 75 
Longreef Investments A.V.V. v. Bolivarian Repunlic of 
Venezuela 78 
PITA FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2019  1:46 PM 
2019]  SAIL WE MUST 209 
Rusoro Mining v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 78 
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic 78 
Transban Investments v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela 78 
Perenco v. Republic of Ecuador 80 
Quiborax v. Plurinational State of Bolivia 80 
Aktau Petrol v. Republic of Kazakhstan 84 
OI European Group  v. Venezuela 86 
Big Sky Energy v. Republic of Kazakhstan 93 
Koch Minerals and Koch Nitrogen v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela 94 
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic 96 
Nations Energy, Inc. and others v. Republic of Panama 
(2) 100 
Opic Karimum Corp. v. Venezuela 108 
Participaciones Inversiones Portuarias SARL v. 
Gabonese Republic 110 
Abaclat v. Argentine Republic 113 
Vattenfall AB v. Fed. Republic of Germany 114 
Muhammet Cap v. Turkemistan 117 
Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine 118 
Saint-Gobain Plastics v. Venezuela 121 
Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic 129 
Blue Bank v. Argentina 141 
Urbaser v. Argentina  147 
Repsol v. Argentina 148 
Suez and Interagua v. Argentine Republic 171 
Suez and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic  171 
Tethyan Copper Co. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan 179 
Asset Recovery Trust v. Argentine Republic  192 
Burlington Res. v. Ecuador 194 
Supervision y Control S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica 231 
Carnegie Minerals (Gambia) Ltd. v. Republic of the 
Gambia 260 
EDF v. Argentina 330 
Pey Casado v. Chile 351***** 
Fabrica de Vidrios and Owens-Illinois v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela  356 
ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela 403 
Universal Compression v. Venezuela 536 
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Utsch M.O.V.E.R.S International v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt 851 
Amco v.  Indonesia Unknown 
Corn Products Int’l, Inc. v. United Mexican States Unknown 
Salini v. Jordan Unknown 
Zhinvali v. Georgia Unknown 
* This number does not reflect the second proposal for disqualification that 
was filed, since the proceeding was discontinued before the proposal could 
be decided upon by the Tribunal. 
** This challenge took place during an annulment proceeding of the original 
award. 
*** This number does not reflect the delay caused by the second proposal for 
disqualification, which the Tribunal has not yet decided upon. 
**** This challenge took place during an interpretation proceeding of the original 
award. 
***** This number does not reflect the delay caused by the first two arbitrator 
challenges, the lengths of which are unknown. 
